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Abstract
This paper studies how the local environment in receiving counties aﬀected the eco-
nomic, social, and political integration of the eight million expellees who arrived in West
Germany after World War II. We ﬁrst document that integration outcomes diﬀered dra-
matically across West German counties. We then show that more industrialized counties
and counties with low expellee inﬂows were much more successful in integrating expellees
than agrarian counties and counties with high inﬂows. Religious diﬀerences between na-
tive West Germans and expellees had no eﬀect on labor market outcomes, but reduced
inter-marriage rates and increased the local support for anti-expellee parties.
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 1 Introduction
Does successful integration of refugees depend only on the innate characteristics of refugees,
or is there also a role for the local environment of the host country? Does it matter whether
refugees are re-settled in rural or urban areas of a host country, in small or large numbers,
in culturally close or distant regions? All of these questions are central for designing refugee
resettlement programs but have been largely overlooked in prior literature. This paper ad-
dresses the role of the local environment for integration in the context of one of the largest
forced population movements in history, the mass displacement of ethnic Germans from East-
ern Europe to West Germany after World War II. Eight million displaced persons arrived
in West Germany between 1944 and 1950, most of them from the territories that Germany
relinquished after the war. The integration of these expellees (Heimatvertriebene) was widely
seen as the single most important challenge that the war-ridden country faced after 1945.
We empirically assess three hypotheses, formulated by contemporary social scientists, on
the local determinants of expellee integration. First, we assess the argument that high pop-
ulation shares of expellees deteriorated integration outcomes. Second, we test whether rural
and agrarian regions were less successful in integrating expellees than urban regions. Third,
we evaluate whether religious diﬀerences between expellees and non-expellees had a negative
impact on integration outcomes. Drawing on newly digitalized census and administrative data
at the county level, we embrace a broad concept of integration: We use local labor market
outcomes, inter-marriage rates between expellees and native West Germans, and electoral
support for expellee and anti-expellee parties to measure the economic, social, and political
integration of expellees.
Three features of our setting are important for the empirical analysis. First, economic,
social, and political integration outcomes of expellees varied dramatically across West German
counties. Looking at economic integration, for instance, expellees’ labor-force-to-population
ratio ranged from 31.6% to 59.0%. Second, West German counties were very heterogeneous
in terms of their sectoral employment structure and predominant Christian confession before
the expellee inﬂow as well as in the population share of expellees they received. That is,
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 the local environment that expellees encountered diﬀered substantially. Third, our speciﬁc
historical setting creates quasi-exogenous variation in the initial placement of expellees. The
initial regional distribution of expellees was largely driven by the proximity to expellees’ origin
regions, and not by integration prospects (Connor 2007, Mu¨ller and Simon 1959, Nellner 1959):
At the ﬁnal stages of the war, ethnic Germans from East Europe ﬂed from the approaching
Red Army to nearby regions in West Germany. After the war, military governments in
the West German occupation zones, overwhelmed by the size and pace of the inﬂow, were
unable to distribute expellees according to their religious aﬃliation or local job prospects.
Local German administration initially had no inﬂuence on the distribution of expellees. It
is the quasi-exogenous variation in the initial placement of expellees that allows us to study
the causal eﬀect of expellee density, of the pre-war employment share in agriculture, and of
religious diﬀerences between natives and expellees on integration outcomes.
While the occupying powers’ military governments in West Germany did not distribute
expellees according to their integration prospects, the local housing supply did inﬂuence the
distribution. Given that much of the German housing stock lay in ruins after the war,
the prime concern of the authorities was to provide expellees with a roof over their heads
(Nellner 1959). Our empirical analysis thus controls for various indicators of war destruction
to alleviate the concern that the local destruction level might have driven both the initial
distribution of expellees and their subsequent integration outcomes. The initial, very unequal
regional distribution of expellees persisted for several years after the war, as the occupying
powers severely restricted relocations within Germany. In our empirical analysis, we use an
instrumental variable (IV) strategy to address remaining concerns that expellees relocated
endogenously within Germany after their initial placement. Our instrument isolates variation
in regional expellee shares that is attributable to the initial placement of expellees and not to
subsequent movements.
All of our analyses are based on unique historical census and administrative data which
we were able to digitalize for the study. Our data set draws on statistics at the county
level from the population and occupation censuses in 1939, 1946, and 1950, and the housing
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 census in 1950. We further employ voting statistics for 1950, 1954, 1958 and 1962, sales tax
statistics for 1935, marriage statistics for 1948 to 1952, and data on war destructions from
the 1949 statistical yearbook of German municipalities and the county map (Kreismappe) of
the Institut fu¨r Raumforschung.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, the regional expellee share had strong negative ef-
fects on the economic, social, and political integration of expellees in 1950, i.e., ﬁve years after
the war. A one standard deviation increase in the expellee share of a county decreases labor
force participation of expellees by 0.4 standard deviations (or 5%), reduces inter-marriage
rates by 0.3 standard deviations and increases the support for anti-expellee parties by 0.4
standard deviations (or 15%). This suggests a limited absorptive capacity of receiving coun-
ties. Higher expellee shares might intensify the tension between natives and expellees and
make it easier for expellees to keep their own company.
Second, high shares of agricultural employment had an even stronger adverse eﬀect on
expellees’ labor force participation: A one standard deviation increase in the share of indi-
viduals working in agriculture before the war reduces expellees labor force participation rate
by 0.5 standard deviations (or 7.7%). Agricultural employment also worsened social and po-
litical integration outcomes but was less important for explaining regional diﬀerences in these
variables. This suggests that resentments against expellees were higher in more agrarian re-
gions, and that agrarian regions also had less capacity to absorb surplus population. The
ﬁndings highlight potential costs of sending today’s refugees to rural areas in order to avoid
the formation of ghettos in the cities.
Third, diﬀerences in the religious confession between expellees and natives reduced inter-
marriage rates and increased the vote share of anti-expellee parties, but had no eﬀect on
expellees’ labor market outcomes. This is consistent with the notion that shared values and
traditions facilitate the social integration of refugees.
Fourth, political integration, the only dimension for which we have data over a longer time
period, takes a considerable amount of time to complete. We ﬁnd that the share of expellees
and the religious distance between expellees and natives remain a strong predictor for the
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 success of anti-expellee parties in 1954 and 1958. More than ten years after the arrival of
expellees, a one-standard-deviation increase in the share of expellees still increases the vote
share of the anti-expellee party by 2.0 percentage points.
Fifth, we show that the three factors we study–the regional population share of expellees,
the pre-war employment share in agriculture, and religious diﬀerences between expellees and
natives–explain a large part of the regional variation in integration outcomes. We ﬁnd, for
instance, that regional diﬀerences in the expellee share and in pre-war agricultural employment
account for more than 60% of the variation in expellees’ labor force participation. Overall, our
results highlight that the local environment strongly shapes subsequent integration outcomes,
and should thus be an important consideration when resettling forced migrants.
Related literature. Our paper complements a nascent literature that studies the distribu-
tion of (forced) migrants across countries, but generally abstracts from the eﬀects on integra-
tion outcomes. Hatton (2015, 2016) argues that there is a strong case for a common asylum
policy in the European Union (EU), but that such a policy can only reach the socially optimal
number of admitted refugees if some form of ﬁnancial burden-sharing exists. His arguments
are based on a simple theoretical model of two symmetric countries, in which citizens value
the admission of refugees to either country, but only face costs if refugees are admitted to
their own country. Hosting refugees can then be viewed as an international public good that
will be under-provided in the absence of cooperation.
Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2014) also start from the idea that hosting
forced migrants creates costs for the host country and consider positive externalities for peo-
ple who care about world poverty. They then show that tradeable immigration quotas can
reveal country-speciﬁc costs of hosting migrants and thus each country’s comparative advan-
tage in hosting migrants. Since migrants typically have preferences over destination coun-
tries, and destination countries have preferences over migrants, Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga
and Rapoport (2014) supplement the tradeable quota system with a matching mechanism
that takes those preferences into account. Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2015a)
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 discuss how such as a framework could work in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis and
Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2015b) apply the framework to the EU Common
Asylum Policy. They underline that EU countries trade quotas previously assigned to them
through an allocation rule. Proposals for such allocation rules are widespread in the political
debate. These rules typically calculate a country’s “capacity” of hosting migrants based on
economic criteria, such as population size, GDP per capita or the unemployment rate (see,
for instance, Thielemann (2010) and European Commission (2015)). Such a rule, based on
regional population and tax income, exists e.g. for the distribution of today ’s refugees within
Germany. Our empirical ﬁndings show how the regional distribution of forced migrants af-
fects their subsequent integration outcomes, and can thus help to formulate evidence-based
allocation rules.
Our result that expellee inﬂows increased the vote share for anti-expellee parties is consis-
tent with recent evidence for Denmark. Dustmann et al. (2016) exploit quasi-random variation
in the timing of refugee allocation, induced by a dispersal policy that randomly distributed
refugees across Denmark. They ﬁnd that outside urban municipalities, allocation of larger
refugee shares between elections increases the vote share of anti-immigration and centre-right
parties.
Damm (2009) exploits the same Danish dispersal policy to study the eﬀect of ethnic en-
claves, as measured by local ethnic concentration, on immigrants’ labor market outcomes. The
paper shows that seven years after their arrival, living in an ethnic enclave has a signiﬁcantly
positive eﬀect on the earnings of refugees. Edin et al. (2003) also ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of living
in an enclave on earnings of low-skilled refugees in Sweden, but not on earnings of high-skilled
refugees. Our paper diﬀers from the previous literature on ethnic enclaves in that we study
the eﬀect of the number of jointly resettled refugees on integration outcomes–and not the
eﬀect of the pre-existing local ethnic network. This distinction is likely to matter: Beaman
(2012) shows for the US that the labor market outcomes of newly arrived refugees deteriorate
with an increase in the number of recently resettled refugees of the same nationality.
Our paper also contributes to a small but growing literature on the economic eﬀects of
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 displacement (reviewed in Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2013)). Sarvima¨ki et al. (2009) study the
long-term eﬀects of the displacement of Finns from areas ceded to the Soviet Union after World
War II. While they ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of displacement on the long-term income of male Finns
who lived in rural areas before the displacement, the literature mainly documents negative
economic eﬀects of displacement. In post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, employment rates
are lower for displaced Bosnians than for Bosnians who stayed behind (Kondylis 2010), and
displaced households in Northern Uganda experienced a signiﬁcant decrease in consumption
levels and asset values relative to comparable non-displaced households (Fiala 2015). Iba´n˜ez
and Ve´lez (2008) estimate that welfare losses caused by displacement within Colombia amount
to 37% of the household’s net present value of rural lifetime aggregate consumption. None
of these papers studies how the displacement eﬀect varies with characteristics of the initial
resettlement location.
A few papers have exploited the quasi-experimental variation in our setting to study the
eﬀect of expellee inﬂows on structural change, native labor market outcomes, and regional
population patterns in West Germany. Braun and Mahmoud (2014) document that large
expellee inﬂows substantially reduced native employment in the short run. Braun and Weber
(2016) consider a dynamic search and matching model to analyze how regional labor markets
in West Germany adjusted to the inﬂow of workers over time. Braun and Kvasnicka (2014)
show that expellee inﬂows fostered structural change away from low-productivity agriculture,
but had a negative short-run eﬀect on output per worker. Finally, Schumann (2014) uses a
spatial regression discontinuity approach to show that the expellee inﬂow had a persistent
eﬀect on regional population patterns in the German state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg.
Regarding the economic integration of expellees, Bauer et al. (2013) compares the eco-
nomic situation of expellees and native West Germans with identical pre-war observable char-
acteristics. Their results show that in 1971, expellees and natives still performed strikingly
diﬀerent on the West German labor market (in line with earlier ﬁndings by Luettinger (1986)).
In particular, expellees still earned signiﬁcantly lower incomes than native West Germans and
were over-represented among unqualiﬁed workers. Falck et al. (2012) show that the relative
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 occupational position of expellees did not improve after the Federal Expellee Law (Bundesver-
triebenengesetz ) had been enacted in 1953, and hence conclude that the law did not achieve its
aim of improving the labor market prospects of expellees. Whereas prior empirical literature
provides important insights into the situation of expellees on the labor market, it neglects the
importance of the local environment for integration, which is the focus of our study.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the ﬂight and
expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe. Section 3 explores regional variation in
the integration outcomes of expellees, and outlines factors that can potentially explain these
diﬀerences. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and the data we use. Section 5 discusses
our results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Flight and Expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe
This section describes the ﬂight and expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, the
regional distribution of expellees in West Germany, and their socio-demographic character-
istics relative to the native West German population. Henceforth, we will refer to those
territories east of Germany’s today’s border that Germany lost after World War I or II as
eastern territories. Figure 1 depicts Germany’s territorial losses after the two world wars.
Flight and expulsion. Between 1944 and 1950, 12-14 million Germans were displaced from
Eastern Europe. The displacement took place in three phases between 1944 and 1950 (for
further details see Connor (2007), Douglas (2012) and Schulze (2011)).
The ﬁrst phase of the displacement took place at the ﬁnal stages of World War II and
began when Soviet troops entered East Prussia in October 1944. The Soviet oﬀensive on the
East front prompted more than six million refugees from Germany’s eastern territories to ﬂee
westwards (Oltmer 2010). Since the Nazis often delayed organized evacuations until it was
too late, many people ﬂed on their own. They either took the last train or ships out of the
territories under attack or ﬂed on foot. Refugees’ initial destination in the West were largely
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 Figure 1: Germany’s Territorial Losses 1919-45 and its Division in 1945
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Base maps: MPIDR (2011).
determined by the available escape routes (Mu¨ller and Simon 1959). Many East Prussians,
for instance, rushed to the ports on the Baltic Sea and boarded ships that brought them to
North Germany.
After Nazi Germany’s surrender in May 1945, many refugees tried to return home. How-
ever, Polish and Soviet troops soon turned refugees away at the Oder/Neisse line (see Figure
1). At the same time, authorities in Poland–soon to be followed by those in Czechoslovakia–
began expelling the remaining German population. These so-called ‘wild’ expulsions, which
marked the second phase of the displacement, were not yet sanctioned by an international
agreement, and continued until the end of 1945. Ethnic Germans were typically forced out
of their homes on short notice and rounded up into holding camps. They were then either
put on trains, or were marched to the border and driven into occupied Germany. While the
8
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 number of ethnic Germans displaced during the wild expulsions remains unclear, existing
estimates suggests that by the end of 1945, 800,000 to 1,000,000 people were displaced from
Czechoslovakia alone (Douglas 2012).
The third phase of the displacement began in August 1945 when the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom and the United States concluded the Potsdam Agreement. The Agreement
shifted the border between Germany and Poland westwards to the Oder-Neisse line. The
eastern parts of Pomerania and Brandenburg, and most of East Prussia, were placed under
Polish control. The rest of East Prussia went to the Soviet Union. German territories west of
the Oder-Neisse line were divided into four occupation zones: a French zone in the southwest,
a British zone in the northwest, an American zone in the south, and a Soviet zone in the
east (see Figure 1). The three Western zones were later merged into the Federal Republic of
Germany (henceforth: West Germany), the focus of our analysis. The Soviet zone became
the German Democratic Republic (henceforth: East Germany).
The Potsdam Agreement of August 1945 also legalized the expulsions of Germans from
Eastern Europe and stipulated ‘that the transfer to [postwar] Germany of German popula-
tions, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will have to
be undertaken’. In November 1945, the Allied Control Council approved a timeline for the
organized expulsion of the estimated 6.65 million Germans who were still living in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary at that time. The council also set quotas for the expellee intake
of each occupation zone. Most of the organized expulsion transfers took place in 1946, but
transfers continued on a smaller scale until 1950. Germans were either brought to holding
camps or immediately put on often overloaded trains, which brought them to reception points
in occupied Germany.
Regional Distribution. The ﬂight and expulsion of ethnic Germans from East and Central
Europe involved at least 12 million people. By September 1950, 7.876 million of them had
settled in West Germany where they accounted for 16.5% of the population. The majority
of them–around 4.423 million–had lived in the eastern territories that Germany ceded after
9
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 Figure 2: Population Share of Expellees in West German Counties, 9/1950
≤ 6.3%
6.4% - 10.3%
10.4% - 15.0%
15.1% - 19.2%
19.3% - 22.6%
22.7% - 25.3%
25.4% - 29.5%
≥ 29.6%
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows the population share of expellees on 13 September 1950. The black line depicts
the border of the three occupation zones.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1955). Basemap: MPIDR (2011).
World War II, namely Silesia (2.053 million), East Prussia (1.347 million), Pomerania (0.891
million) and Brandenburg (0.131 million). In addition, 1.912 million expellees came from the
Sudentenland, the German-speaking part of Czechoslovakia which Nazi Germany annexed in
September 1938. The remaining expellees had mostly lived in the eastern territories that
Germany ceded after World War I, namely in Posen and West Prussia.
Importantly, expellees were distributed very unevenly across West Germany. Figure 2
depicts the county-level population share of expellees in September 1950. Three main facts
stand out. First, the overall population share of expellees was much lower in the French
occupation zone (6.6%) than in the American (18.7%) and British zone (17.2%). This was
because the French initially refused to accept any newcomers into their zone. The French
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 had not been invited to the Potsdam conference. Therefore, they did not feel obliged to
the commitment of the Potsdam agreement to secure an ‘equitable distribution’ of expellees
across occupation zones.
Second, the population share of expellees was considerably higher in the eastern parts of
the American and British occupation zones than in the western parts. This is particularly
evident for the British zone where the expellee share was well above 30% in the north-east
but as low as 5% in the far west. These enormous diﬀerences were mostly the result of the
undirected ﬂight of refugees at the ﬁnal stages of the war. During this ﬁrst phase of the
displacement, refugees mostly sought shelter in those regions of West Germany that were
closest to their former homelands and thus most accessible to them (Mu¨ller and Simon 1959).
Many Germans from East Prussia, for instance, ﬂed via the Baltic Sea to Schleswig-Holstein
in the far north of Germany.
The ‘wild expulsions’ of the second phase only worsened these imbalances. Refugees were
often just driven across the border into the eastern parts of occupied Germany. Germans
from the Sudetenland, for instance, were often forced into neighbouring Bavaria. Even the
organized transport of the third phase typically brought expellees to reception points in the
east of each occupation zone.
Third, the population share of expellees was higher in rural areas than in cities. This
was because many cities were in shambles after the war. Since housing was scarce, the
military governments in the American and British occupation zones frequently restricted
relocations into cities (Mu¨ller and Simon 1959). Instead, expellees were often housed in
more rural areas where the housing stock had suﬀered less from bombing (Burchardi and
Hassan 2013, Connor 2007). This rural-urban divide added to the regional imbalances, as the
rural areas in the north- and southeast of Germany were already overburdened with refugees
due to their geographical proximity to the eastern territories and the Sudetenland. It also
explains why some of the smaller urban counties (Stadtkreise) in Figure 2 have low expellee
shares despite being surrounded by larger rural counties (Landkreise) with very high shares.
The very unequal regional distribution of expellees remained largely unchanged in the ﬁrst
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 few years after the war.1 The occupying powers severely restricted the ability of Germans
to change residence, and initially banned relocation altogether. After the ban was relaxed
in 1947, moving still required permission from military authorities (permission was primarily
granted for family reuniﬁcation). It was not until the foundation of West Germany in May
1949 before the general freedom of movement was restored (Mu¨ller and Simon 1959, Ziemer
1973).
Socio-demographic characteristics. Expellees and natives were similar in several impor-
tant respects. They both spoke German as their mother tongue and had both been educated
in German schools. Moreover, the ceded eastern provinces, home to most expellees, had all
been an integral part of the German Reich since the Reich was formed in 1871. Most ex-
pellees and natives had therefore lived in the same country for decades. Expellees were also
not a selected sub-group of their home regions, as virtually all Germans living east of the
Oder-Neisse line ﬂed or were expelled.
As a result, socio-demographic characteristics of expellees and natives were similar. Table
1 shows that females outnumbered males both in the expellee and the non-expellee population,
a legacy of the two world wars. Expellees were slightly younger, somewhat more likely to
be single, and slightly better educated than the rest of the population. Overall, however,
diﬀerences between expellees and natives were small, especially when compared to other
migration episodes.
The mass arrival of expellees also had little impact on the denominational structure of
West Germany as a whole. The shares of Catholics and Protestants were very similar in the
expellees and non-expellees population (see again Table 1). However, the inﬂow of expellees
had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the denominational structure at a local level. As the expellees
could not choose their initial destination based on the predominant Christian confession, and
German authorities did not account for the religion of expellees when distributing them, many
Catholic expellees ended up in predominately Protestant regions and vice versa (Connor 2007).
In Bavaria, for instance, the number of exclusively Catholic or Protestant parishes fell from
1The correlation coeﬃcient between the county-level population share of expellees in 1946 and 1950 is 0.966.
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 Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of expellees and non-expellees in West Germany,
September 1950
Expelleesa
Rest of the 
populationb
% females 52.9 53.2
Age structure
   % aged 0-17 29.7 27.7
   % aged 18-24 11.3 10.1
   % aged 25-44 30.0 27.9
   % aged 45-64 21.8 24.6
   % aged 65 and above 7.2 8.6
Marital status (aged 18 and above)
   % single 25.7 23.4
   % married 60.4 64.0
   % widowed or divorced 14.0 12.5
Education (born 1885-1927)c
Years of schoolingd 8.5 8.4
   % vocational training 37.3 37.6
   % university degree 3.5 2.9
Religious confession
   % Catholic 45.4 45.4
   % Protestant 52.8 50.7
   % Other 1.8 3.9
Data sources: All data except for educational attainment are from the census of 13 September 1950, as
published by Statistisches Bundesamt (1952). Figures on education are from our own calculations based
on a 10% sample of the census of 27 May 1970 (FDZ 2008). Parts of the table are reproduced from Braun
and Kvasnicka (2014).
Notes: a Expellees are deﬁned as German nationals or ethnic Germans who on 1 September 1939 lived
(i) in the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, (ii) in Saarland or (iii) abroad, but only
if their mother tongue was German. b The education statistics distinguish between expellees and native
West Germans (excluding non-German foreigners). All other statistics distinguish between expellees and
the rest of the population. c The education statistics are for those who were born between 1885 and
1927 (aged 23 to 65 in 1950). The overwhelming majority of these persons should have completed their
education by 1950. d We only have data on the highest school degree. Years of schooling are inferred from
the minimum years of schooling required to obtain a particular degree.
1,564 in 1939 to just nine in 1950 (Menges 1959).
Panel (a) of Figure 3 illustrates diﬀerences in the religious aﬃliation of expellees and non-
expellees at county level in September 1950. It depicts the Euclidean distance between the
religious aﬃliations of expellees and non-expellees in county i:
ReligiousDistancei50 =
√∑
j
(
sharenatij50 − shareexpij50
)2
, (1)
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 where sharenatij50 (share
exp
ij50) is the share of natives (expellees) in county i who belong to
confession j. We distinguish between Catholic, Protestant, and other religious aﬃliations.
Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows that the denominational structure of expellees and natives
was relatively similar in the Protestant north of Germany, where mainly Protestant East
Prussians arrived, and in the Catholic south-east, where many Catholic Sudeten Germans
arrived. Diﬀerences were larger in western, middle, and south-eastern parts of the country.
Many Catholic Sudeten Germans, for instance, were brought to settle in the mainly Protestant
areas of North-Hesse and Franconia.
Panel (a) only depicts religious diﬀerences between the average expellee and native, but
sheds no light on the overall eﬀect of the expellee inﬂow on the denominational structure of
a region. To capture how expellees changed a region’s denominational structure, we consider
the Euclidean distance between the actual denominational structure of a county, sharetotalij50 ,
and the denominational structure of natives, sharenatij50:
ChangeReligioni50 =
√∑
j
(
sharetotalij50 − sharenatij50
)2
= ExpelleeSharei50 ×
√∑
j
(
sharenatij50 − shareexpij50
)2
. (2)
The denominational structure of natives can be thought of as the hypothetical denominational
structure of the region that would have prevailed without the inﬂow of expellees. Equation
(2) illustrates that the overall change in the religious proﬁle, ChangeReligioni50, equals the
denominational diﬀerence of expellees and non-expellees, ReligiousDistancei50 (see above),
times the regional population share of expellees, ExpelleeSharei50.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows that the expellee inﬂow had the greatest eﬀect on the denom-
inational structure of Lower Saxony, Northern Hesse, and Franconia. In the North-Hessian
county of Giessen, for instance, 94% of the native population but only 22% of the expellee
population were Protestants. Since expellees made up a quarter of the total population, the
overall share of Protestants in the county was ‘only’ 76%, down from 96.5% before the war.
Changes in the religious proﬁle were much more moderate in Schleswig-Holstein or Southern
14
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 Figure 3: Expellee Inﬂows and the Religious Proﬁle of West German Counties, 9/1950
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(b) Overall Change in Denominational Structure
Notes: The ﬁgure depicts the Euclidean distance between the denominational structure of a) expellees
and non-expellees (Panel (a)) and b) the overall population and non-expellees (Panel (b)). See equations
(1) and (2) and the corresponding description in the main text for more details. The black line depicts
the border of the three occupation zones. The graphs divide the population into eight equally numerous
subsets (octiles).
Sources: Own calculations based on Statistisches Bundesamt (1952). Basemap: MPIDR (2011).
Bavaria although these regions received very large inﬂows of expellees.
3 The Integration of Expellees in West Germany
The integration of eight million expellees into the West German economy and society posed
a paramount challenge to the war-ridden country. This section presents descriptive evidence
on the economic, social, and political integration of expellees in 1950, i.e., ﬁve years after
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 the end of World War II. We show that the degree of integration varied greatly across West
German counties. We then outline the factors that can potentially explain these diﬀerences,
drawing on previous analyses of historians, sociologists, and contemporary observers.
Economic Integration. We consider the employment situation of expellees as our indicator
for the economic integration of expellees, in line with contemporary observers (Connor 2007).
We use the share of economically active persons in the expellee population (henceforth, labor
force participation rate) as our main indicator and consider the share of employed persons in
the population (henceforth, employment rate) as an alternative indicator.
Employment data come from the census of 17 September 1950. The census distinguished
between economically active persons (Erwerbspersonen), independent economically inactive
persons (Selbsta¨ndige Beruﬂose), and dependent economically inactive persons (Angeho¨rige
ohne Beruf ) (Statistisches Bundesamt 1955).2 We calculate the labor force participation rate
as the share of economically active persons in the total expellee population of a county.3
Importantly, there are many contemporary accounts that expellees, discouraged by dismal
employment prospects, withdraw from the labor market and either retired early or returned
to the fold (Pfeil 1958). The labor force participation rate captures this discouragement eﬀect
and can be precisely calculated for all West German counties.
The main drawback of the labor force participation rate is that it does not distinguish
between economically active persons with and without employment. Although the census
distinguished between the two groups,4 the German Statistical Oﬃce never published the
2Economically active persons are those who were in full-time employment at the time of the census or were
looking for full-time employment. Part-time workers were not counted as economically active. Independent
economically inactive persons were economically inactive but supported themselves through, in particular,
retirement pensions or disability beneﬁts. Dependent economically inactive persons were economically inactive
and depended economically on another household member.
3 We cannot calculate the share of economically active expellees in the working-age population, as data on
the expellee population by age is only available at the district level, but not at the more disaggregated county
level. However, as a robustness check, we calculate a proxy for the county-level expellee population of working
age by multiplying the district-level share of expellees aged 18 to 65 with the county-level expellee population.
We then use this proxy to calculate the share of economically active persons in the expellee population aged
18 to 65. Section 5 shows that our conclusions are unchanged when using this variable as our measure for
economic integration. This is to be expected as selection into speciﬁc regions was of no concern in our historical
context, and regional diﬀerences in the age distribution of expellees were therefore relatively small.
4The census counted all persons as unemployed who usually carried out a full-time job but did not have
employment at the time of the census. This includes persons not registered as unemployed at an employment
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 corresponding data at the county level and the original census records are, to the best of our
knowledge, no longer available today. Fortunately, Pfeil (1958) drew on the original census
records to calculate the share of economically active persons without employment (henceforth,
unemployment rate), distinguishing also between expellees and non-expellees.
We use the data in Pfeil (1958) to calculate the employment rate, i.e., the share of employed
persons in the population, as (100 − Unemployment rate) × Labor force participation rate.
Unfortunately, Pfeil only reports the unemployment rate in nine ranked categories, ranging
from 0-4% to above 32%. We use midpoints of these categories to calculate the employment
rate. Moreover, the unemployment rate is not available for the federal states of Su¨dbaden
and Wu¨rttemberg-Hohenzollern, so that we can not calculate the employment rate for the 39
counties located in these two states. This is why we use the labor force participation rate
rather than the employment rate as our main indicator of economic integration.
In West Germany as a whole, the labor force participation rate of expellees was 42.2% in
September 1950. This is 4.2 percentage points lower than the participation rate of natives
(46.4%). Diﬀerences between natives and expellees were even more pronounced with respect
to the employment rate: 44.2% of the native population but only 35.9% of the expellee
population were employed in September 1950.
Figure 4 illustrates that the aggregate numbers hide considerable regional variation in the
labor market integration of expellees. The left panel shows that the labor force participation
rate of expellees diﬀers greatly across West German counties. It varies from 37.0% or less in
regions in the lowest octile to 49.2% or more in the highest octile. There are clear regional
clusters: Labor force participation is particularly low in the north, north-west, and south-
east of West Germany and particularly high in the west and south-west of the country. These
clusters are at times interrupted by the co-existence of small urban counties with higher
participation rates and larger rural counties with lower participation rates.
The right panel, which depicts the employment rate of expellees in West German counties,
reinforces these observations. The employment rate of expellees varies considerably between
oﬃce.
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 Figure 4: Labor Market Integration of Expellees in West German Counties, 9/1950
≤ 37.0%
37.1% - 38.5%
38.6% - 40.1%
40.2% - 41.9%
42.0% - 44.1%
44.2% - 46.2%
46.3% - 49.1%
≥ 49.2%
(a) Labor force participation rate
≤ 26.7%
26.8% - 30.1%
30.2% - 32.4%
32.5% - 35.4%
35.5% - 38.4%
38.5% - 42.3%
42.4% - 45.4%
≥ 45.5%
(b) Employment rate
Notes: The labor force participation rate is the share of economically active persons in the expellee
population and the employment rate is the share of employed persons in the population. See the description
in the main text for more details. The black line depicts the border of the three occupation zones.
The employment rate is not available for counties in the federal states of Su¨dbaden and Wu¨rttemberg-
Hohenzollern. The graphs divide the population into eight equally numerous subsets (octiles).
Sources: Own calculations based on Statistisches Bundesamt (1955) and Pfeil (1958). Basemap: MPIDR
(2011).
26.7% or less in regions in the lowest octile and 45.5% or more in the highest octile. Again,
employment is particularly low in the north, north-west and south-east of West Germany and
particularly high in the west and south-west of the country. The correlation between labor
force participation and employment rates is 0.928.
Social Integration. Following contemporary sociologists (Mu¨ller 1950, Poepelt 1959), we
use intermarriage rates between expellees and non-expellees as indicator for the social in-
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 tegration of expellees. Let a be the number of marriages between non-expellee men and
non-expellee women in a region, b the number of marriages between non-expellee men and
expellee women, c the number of marriages between expellee men and non-expellee women,
and d the number of marriages between expellee men and expellee women (see Table 2). The
indicator then compares the actual number of marriages between non-expellees and expellees,
as given in Table 2, to the hypothetical number expected if the expellee status would not play
any role for the choice of a spouse.
Table 2: Marriage behavior in a region
Non-expellee women Expellee women Sum
Non-expellee men a b a+ b
Expellee men c d c+ d
Sum a+ c b+ d a+ b+ c+ d
Notes: Each entry gives the number of marriages in a cell.
Consider marriages between non-expellee men and expellee women. The actual number of
marriages between non-expellee men and expellee women is b. The expected number is given
by the probability of a randomly drawn men-women pair being a non-expellee man and an
expellee woman, (a+ b)/(a+ b+ c+ d)× (b+ d)/(a+ b+ c+ d), times the total number of
marriages in the region, a+ b+ c+ d. The intermarriage rate between non-expellee men and
expellee women is then calculated as:
100× b
a+b
a+b+c+d × b+da+b+c+d
× (a+ b+ c+ d) = 100× b
(a+b)×(b+d)
a+b+c+d
. (3)
Likewise, the intermarriage rate between expellee men and non-expellee women is:
100× c
c+d
a+b+c+d × a+ca+b+c+d
× (a+ b+ c+ d) = 100× c
(c+d)×(a+c)
a+b+c+d
. (4)
The indicator varies between 0 (no marriages between expellees and non-expellees) and
100 (expellee status plays no role for the choice of a spouse). Higher values of intermarriage
rates hence reﬂect better social integration. Importantly, the intermarriage rates calculated in
equations (3) and (4) do not depend mechanically on the relative population size of expellees
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 and non-expellees, as other commonly used indicators do (such as the share of marriages
between two groups in the total number of married couples).
The average intermarriage rates across West German counties are 67.0 for expellee women
and 71.9 for expellee men; expellees and non-expellees are signiﬁcantly less likely to marry each
other than what a random match suggests. Again, there is substantial regional heterogeneity.
Drawing on data from Poepelt (1959), Figure 5 depicts county-level intermarriage rates in
1950–separately for expellee women and expellee men (data for Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein
are only available at the federal state level). For female (male) expellees, the intermarriage
rate varies from 52.7 (58.3) or less in regions in the lowest octile to 80.3 (85.0) or more for
regions in the highest octile. Clear regional clusters arise: Intermarriage rates are particularly
low in the south and in some parts of the north-west of West Germany and particularly high
in the west.
Political Integration. The occupying powers harbored deep fears that the expellees could
destabilize the young West German democracy–and thus placed strong emphasis on the po-
litical integration of expellees (Connor 2007). In fact, the Allies banned refugee organizations
until the beginning of 1950, as they saw them as a potential source for the re-emergence
of nationalism in Germany, and placed the responsibility of integrating expellees on the es-
tablished parties. The established parties, in turn, were often reluctant to embrace expellee
demands, as they feared losing the support of non-expellee voters. In fact, parties frequently
campaigned on an outspoken anti-expellee stance.
The political integration of expellees can be studied from two perspectives, the electoral
success of anti-expellee parties and that of expellee parties. Ideally, we would like to study a
national election, in which both an anti-expellee and an expellee party competed for votes.
However, expellee parties were still banned when West Germany’s ﬁrst national election was
held in August 1949. Moreover, several parties only stood for election in a limited number of
federal states, making it diﬃcult to compare voting behavior across federal states.
Instead, we focus on the election for state parliament in Bavaria, one of the main refugee
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 Figure 5: Inter-Marriage between Expellees and Non-Expellees in West German Counties,
1950
≤ 52.7
52.8 - 58.3
58.4 - 63.5
63.6 - 68.1
68.2 - 72.5
72.6 - 76.7
76.8 - 80.2
≥ 80.3
(a) Female expellees
≤ 58.3
58.4 - 64.6
64.7 - 68.8
68.9 - 72.8
72.9 - 76.0
76.1 - 80.0
80.1 - 84.9
≥ 85.0
(b) Male expellees
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the intermarriage rates between expellee women and non-expellee men (left
panel) and between expellee men and non-expellee women (right panel). See equations (3) and (4) and the
corresponding description in the main text for more details on the calculation. The intermarriage rates
are only available at the federal state level for the states of Hessen and Schleswig-Holstein. The graphs
divide the population into eight equally numerous subsets (octiles).
Source: Poepelt (1959). Basemap: MPIDR (2011).
states, in November 1950. The election oﬀers three important advantages for our purpose.
First, the expellee party Bund der Heimatvertriebenen (BHE) stood for election, forming
an electoral pact with the right-wing nationalist party Deutsche Gemeinschaft (DG). The
BHE primarily represented the interest of the expellees, demanding generous compensation
for lost property and the recovery of the territories that Germany ceded after World War II.
Second, with the Bayernpartei (BP), a ﬁercely anti-expellee party stood for election which
articulated native Bavarian concerns of being swamped by foreign expellees (Connor 2007). In
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 an infamous speech, Jakob Fischbacher, one of BP’s founding members, called for the expellees
to be thrown out of the country (Spiegel 1947). Third, the election date was very close to
the date of the census, allowing us to relate regional vote shares to regional characteristics
elicited in the census.
Figure 6 depicts the vote share of BP (left panel) and the combined vote shares of BP
and BHE (right panel) in the Bavarian state election of 26 November 1950, as reported in
Bayerisches Statistisches Landesamt (1951). State-wide, the BP received 17.9% of the vote,
making it the third largest party in parliament (after the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Social Union). The BHE came fourth, receiving 12.3% of votes. In 15 out of 186
Bavarian counties, a majority of voters supported either the BP or the BHE.
The ﬁgure show that the vote shares for the two parties diﬀered greatly across Bavaria. The
BP was most successful in the south-east of Bavaria, reaching as much as 37.3% in Wasserburg
am Inn. It was least successful in the north-west of the country where it frequently fell short
of the 5 percent hurdle required to win seats in parliament. Adding the vote share of the BHE
does not markedly change the picture. The combined share of the two parties were highest
in the south-west and lowest in the north of Bavaria.
Explaining Geographic Diﬀerences in Integration. The great regional diﬀerences in
the degree of economic, social, and political integration were not hidden to contemporary
observers. Pfeil (1958), for instance, described the geographical location of the expellees
as their ‘destiny’. Likewise, there is no shortage of potential explanations for these stark
diﬀerences in integration outcomes. What is missing, however, is a systematic empirical test
of these explanations.
At least three not mutually exclusive hypotheses have been formulated. The ﬁrst hypoth-
esis states that high population shares of expellees were an impediment to local integration.
The hypothesis holds that higher expellee shares intensiﬁed the competition on the labor mar-
ket, slowing down the economic integration of expellees (Braun and Weber 2016, Pfeil 1958).
Higher expellee shares might also have intensiﬁed the tension between natives and expellees
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 Figure 6: Vote Share of Special Interest Parties in Bavarian Federal State Election, 11/1950
≤ 6.4%
6.5% - 11.6%
11.7% - 15%
15.1% - 18.7%
18.8% - 21.5%
21.6% - 24.8%
24.9% - 30.4%
≥ 30.5%
(a) Anti-expellee party: BP
≤ 17.8%
17.9% - 23.8%
23.9% - 28.8%
28.9% - 33.6%
33.7% - 37.5%
37.6% - 41.1%
41.2% - 45.5%
≥ 45.6%
(b) Special interest parties: BP and BHE
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the vote share of BP (left panel) and the combined vote share of BP and BHE
in the Bavarian state election of 26 November 1950. The graphs divide the population into eight equally
numerous subsets (octiles).
Sources: Bayerisches Statistisches Landesamt (1951). Basemap: MPIDR (2011).
and made it easier for expellees to keep their own company (Connor 2007). This might have
decreased inter-marriage rates. By slowing down economic integration, higher expellee shares
might also have increased expellee support for the BHE. Moreover, the perceived threat of
expellees to local traditions might have mobilized native voters to vote for anti-expellee par-
ties.
The second hypothesis states that the integration of expellees was more diﬃcult in rural
and agrarian regions. The hypothesis holds that rural economies had little capacity to absorb
surplus population, rendering the economic integration of expellees diﬃcult (Connor 2007,
Pfeil 1958). In fact, both Connor (2007) and Pfeil (1958) argue that the job prospects of
expellees were determined less by the population share of expellees than by the ‘absorption
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 capacity’ of rural economies. It also has been argued that resentments against expellees
were more pronounced in rural areas, and that relations between farmers and expellees were
especially fraught with problems (Bayerisches Statistisches Landesamt 1950, Connor 2007,
Schulze 2002). These tensions between natives and expellees in rural areas might be reﬂected
in lower intermarriage rates and higher support for expellee and anti-expellee parties.
The third hypothesis states that religious diﬀerences between expellees and natives shaped
integration outcomes. Qualitative regional studies indicate that expellees were more readily
accepted in the predominantly Protestant state of Lower Saxony if they were Protestants
themselves (Brelie-Lewien and Grebing 1997, Schulze 2002). Studies of Catholic Westphalia
and Protestant Northern Hesse reach similar conclusions (Exner 1999, Spiegel-Schmidt 1959).
Consequently, religious diﬀerences between expellees and natives might have slowed down the
social integration of expellees, and might have increased the support for particularist parties.
Religious diﬀerences might also have been an impediment to economic integration of expellees
if they led to discrimination on the labor market.
Summing up the above, we have the following three testable hypotheses:
H1. Higher population shares of expellees deteriorated integration outcomes.
H2. More agrarian regions were less successful in integrating expellees than less agrarian
regions.
H3. Religious diﬀerences between expellees and non-expellees worsened integration out-
comes.
4 Empirical Strategy
We exploit regional variation across West German counties5 to test the three hypotheses. Our
data come from various data sources that we have digitalized for our analysis. The sources
5While there are 556 of such counties in 1950, a few of them experienced changes in their administrative
borders between 1939 and 1950. We account for these border changes by merging counties, so that county
borders are comparable over time (see Appendix A for the details). This leaves us with 526 counties.
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 include the population and occupation censuses of 1939, 1946, and 1950,6 the housing census
in 1950, administrative statistics on the Bavarian state election for 1950, 1954 and 1958, sales
tax statistics for 1935, marriage statistics for 1948 to 1952, and data on war destructions from
the 1949 statistical yearbook of German municipalities and the county map (Kreismappe) of
the Institut fu¨r Raumforschung. Appendix B lists the data source for each variable.
4.1 OLS estimation
Let Yi,50 be a particular indicator for the economic, social, or political integration of expellees
in county i in 1950. Our basic regression speciﬁcation is:
Yi50 = α+ β1ExpelleeSharei50 + β2Agriculturei39 +
+β3ReligiousDistancei50 +Xi39γ + ui50, (5)
where ExpelleeSharei50 is the population share of expellees in county i in 1950, Agriculturei39
is the agricultural employment share in 1939, ReligiousDistancei50 is the religious distance
between expellees and natives in 1950, Xi39 is a vector of control variables for 1939 charac-
teristics, and ui is an error term. As counties vary widely in population size, we estimate
population-weighted regressions (and provide unweighted regression results as a robustness
check).
We consider three sets of integration indicators (see Section 3). First, we use the labor-
force-to-population ratio of expellees as our main indicator for economic integration, and
consider the employment-to-population ratio as an alternative indicator. Second, we use
intermarriage rates between expellees and non-expellees, calculated separately for expellee
men and women, as indicator for social integration. Third, we use the vote share for the
anti-immigrant party Bayernpartei (BP) as our main indicator for political integration, and
consider the sum of the vote share of the BP and the expellee party Block der Heimatver-
triebenen und Entrechteten (BHE) as an alternative indicator.
6To the best of our knowledge, there exist no records of the underlying historical micro census data. Instead,
we digitalized aggregated county-level data published mostly by the German Statistical Oﬃce.
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 The hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 imply that the three main explanatory variables of
interest–expellee share, agricultural employment share, and religious distance–all have a neg-
ative eﬀect on integration.
Population shares of expellees. Consider the expellee share ﬁrst. Estimating equation
(5) by ordinary least squares (OLS) will yield a consistent estimate of β1 if
Cov(ExpelleeSharei50, ui50) = 0. This covariance restriction implies that the expellee share
must not be correlated with any unobserved factor that aﬀects the economic, social, or po-
litical integration of expellees (depending on the outcome variable considered). In particular,
the estimate of β1 will be upward biased if expellees selected, based on unobservable charac-
teristics, into West German regions where they saw higher chances of integration.
The problem of endogenous self-selection is arguably most severe with respect to economic
integration, since the primary concern of expellees in the post-war period was economic de-
privation (Connor 2007) rather than social or political exclusion. In fact, the inner-German
migration of expellees in the 1950s were primarily movitivated by labor market prospects
(Ambrosius 1996, Braun and Weber 2016). However, self-selection into thriving labor mar-
kets was arguably a minor problem until 1950 when we measure expellee shares. Importantly,
the initial distribution of expellees was not driven by local labor market conditions (Braun
and Mahmoud 2014, Nellner 1959). As described in Section 2, expellees ﬁrst ﬂed to regions
close to their homelands, and were later transferred to their ﬁnal destination region by the
authorities. They could therefore not choose their destination based on local labor market
conditions. Moreover, the occupying powers’ military governments did not account for local
job prospects when distributing expellees, and the local West German authorities, if func-
tioning at all after the war, had initially no say in the distribution of expellees (Mu¨ller and
Simon 1959). Once expellees had arrived in a region, they remained severely restricted to
move elsewhere.
Overwhelmed by the size and pace of the inﬂow, the military governments’ prime concern
was to provide expellees with a roof over their head (Nellner 1959). Expellees were thus over-
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 represented in rural areas that were less devastated by the war (see again Section 2). If less
destroyed areas oﬀered better (worse) integration opportunities, this could potentially bias
the eﬀect of expellee density on integration outcomes upwards (downwards). Furthermore,
moving restrictions were gradually phased out until 1949. Some expellees might therefore
have moved endogenously to counties with better integration prospects by 1950.
We deal with these potential problems in two ways. First, we condition on various indica-
tors of war destructions, and also on other local characteristics that may have inﬂuenced the
integration prospects of expellees. Second, we use an instrumental variable (IV) strategy. We
thereby isolate variation in regional expellee shares that is attributable to the initial place-
ment of expellees and not to subsequent movements. We will discuss our control variables
and the IV strategy in subsections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.
Agrarian regions. Consider next the rurality of a region as measured by the agricultural
employment share in 1939. For β2 to have a causal interpretation, the pre-war agricultural
employment share must not be correlated with the error term. We believe that this identifying
assumption is likely to hold. In particular, reverse causality is of no concern since agricultural
employment is measured in 1939 and thus before the arrival of expellees. However, agricultural
employment might still correlate with unobserved determinants of expellee integration. We
deal with this potential problem by controlling for regional characteristics that have been
discussed as potential determinants of expellee integration (see subsection 4.2).
Religious diﬀerences. Focus ﬁnally on the religious distance between expellees and natives
in 1950, as deﬁned in equation (1). The main identifying assumption for a causal interpretation
of β3 is that religious distance must be uncorrelated with any unobserved factor that aﬀects the
economic, social, or political integration of expellees. Reverse causality should again be of little
concern since the religious denomination of expellees and natives were pre-determined and
changes of confession uncommon at the time. However, had expellees chosen their destination
themselves, a high degree of religious distance might correlate with, potentially unobserved,
regional characteristics conducive to integration. After all, Catholic expellees would probably
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 only move to a Protestant region if this region would oﬀer them exceptionally good integration
prospects.
Although endogenous moving decisions should be of little concern in our context (as we
have discussed before), we can not completely rule them out either. We again deal with
this problem in two ways. First, we condition on variables that might have aﬀected expellee
integration. Second, we use an IV strategy to isolate variation in religious distance that is
attributable to the initial distribution of expellees and not to subsequent movements. We
next discuss the control variables and then our IV strategy.
4.2 Control Variables
Our vector of control variables consists of regional characteristics that might have aﬀected
expellee settlement pattern and inﬂuenced expellee integration. First and foremost, we use
rubble at the end of the war per capita in 1939 as a measure of war destruction, following
previous work by Brakman et al. (2004), Burchardi and Hassan (2013) and Braun and Kvas-
nicka (2014). War dislocation might have had an eﬀect on both integration and–through
the availability of housing–on expellee settlement patterns. Data on the amount of rubble,
published in Deutscher Sta¨dtetag (1949), is only available for the 199 largest West German
cities. We aggregate the data to the county level, implicitly assuming war destructions to be
zero in smaller municipalities.
In a robustness check, we use the share of dwellings built until 1945 that were damaged in
the war as an alternative measure. This measure, based on data from Statistisches Bundesamt
(1956), has the advantage that it is available at the county level. However, it is not a direct
measure of war destructions, as it relates only to residential housing that survived the war and
could accommodate residents in 1950. In a second robustness check, we use a dichotomous
variable, published by Institut fu¨r Raumfoschung (1955), that measures the loss in housing
space in three categories (‘no or minor losses’, ‘substantial losses’, ‘very substantial losses’).
The dichotomous variable, which–given the lack of a comprehensive Germany-wide statistic–is
also endorsed in Mu¨ller and Simon (1959), is based on various administrative sources at the
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 national and federal state level.
Second, we control for the share of a county’s population in 1939 that lived in cities with
at least 10,000 inhabitants to account for pre-war diﬀerences in urbanisation, drawing on data
published in Statistisches Reichsamt (1940). City dwellers might be more open to ‘newcomers’,
as they had more contact with people from diﬀerent backgrounds than inhabitants of rural
areas (Connor 2007). At the same time, urban areas were more likely to be devastated in the
Allied bombing campaign and thus received lower expellee inﬂows after the war.
Third, we include a dummy for regions located at the post-war inner German border (dis-
tance smaller than 75 kilometers). The inner German border might have impaired (economic)
integration outcomes as regions at the inner-German border experienced a disproportionate
loss in market access after World War II (Redding and Sturm 2008). At the same time, re-
gions at the inner-German border also experienced high inﬂows of expellees because of their
geographic proximity to the former eastern territories of the German Reich (see Section 2).
Fourth, we add a dummy for whether the majority of a region was Catholic in 1939, based
on data published in Statistisches Reichsamt (1941). Religious aﬃliation might have inﬂu-
enced voting patterns in Bavaria and might also be more generally correlated with economic
outcomes (Becker and Woessmann 2009, Weber 1904/05).
Finally, we use state-level ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobserved factors common to all
counties located in a state. State-level ﬁxed eﬀects also account for unobserved factors at the
occupation-zone level (as each state is located in just one occupation zone).
4.3 IV Estimation
Our regression analysis conditions on covariates that might have aﬀected the initial regional
distribution of expellees, and also on other local characteristics that may have inﬂuenced the
integration prospects of expellees. This distribution was very persistent in the ﬁrst few years
after the war, since the Allies severely restricted the freedom of movement until 1949 (see
Section 2). However, some expellees might still have endogenously moved by 1950, leaving
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 behind their initial destination. If this re-location is based on unobserved characteristics,
which in turn aﬀect expellee integration, OLS estimates of β1 and β3 might be biased. In
particular, one might expect β1 to be upward biased if expellees relocated to regions with
greater employment opportunities.
To deal with potential endogenous self-selection in the late 1940s, we use an IV strategy
and isolate the variation in expellee shares and religious distance which is due to the initial
placement of expellees only. In particular, we use the expellee share in October 1946, when
severe restrictions on mobility were still in place, as an instrument for the expellee share in
September 1950. The ﬁrst stage regression for the expellee share in 1950 is:
ExpelleeSharei50 = η + κ1ExpelleeSharei46 + κ2Agriculturei39
+κ3ReligiousDistancei50 +Xi39κ4 + vi50, (6)
where ExpelleeSharei46 is the population share of expellees in county i in 1946 and Xi39 is the
same set of covariates as in equation (5). The key identifying assumption of the IV regression
is Cov(ExpelleeSharei46, ui50) = 0. The assumption states that (i) there is no unobserved
factor that drives both Yi50 and ExpelleeSharei46, and that (ii) the expellee share in 1946
aﬀects integration in 1950 only through its eﬀect on the expellee share in 1950. In addition,
we need the expellee share 1946 to be relevant for explaining the expellee share in 1950.
In a similar spirit, we also isolate the variation in religious distance that is due to the
initial placement of expellees. Recall that religious distance is measured as:
ReligiousDistancei50 =
[(
sharecath,nati50 − sharecath,expi50
)2
+
(
shareprot,nati50 − shareprot,expi50
)2
+
(
shareother,nati50 − shareother,expi50
)2]0.5
. (7)
Our instrument replaces the 1950 share of expellees belonging to a certain confession with
the correspondent 1946 share. Unfortunately, we do not have regional data on the religious
mark-up of expellees who lived in West Germany in 1946. Instead, we use data on the origin
regions of expellees and the pre-war shares of the diﬀerent confessions in these origin regions.
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 The data allow us to distinguish seven origin regions (Silesia, East Brandenburg, Pomerania,
East Prussia, CSSR (Sudetenland), Poland, Danzig). Let ExpelleeSharesi46 be the 1946 share
of expellees from origin region s among all expellees in region i and let shares,j39 be the 1939
share of the population in origin region s belonging to confession j = {cath, prot, other}. We
then approximate the predicted share of expellees in region i belonging to confession j in 1946
as:
shareji46 =
∑
s
ExpelleeSharesi46 × shares,ji39. (8)
In principle, non-expellees might also have moved endogenously after moving restrictions were
abolished. To address this potential problem, we replace the 1950 share of natives in region
i belonging to confession j, sharej,nati50 , by the corresponding 1939 share, share
j,nat
i39 .
Our instrument is then given by
ReligiousDistancei46 =
[(
sharecath,nati39 − sharecath,expi46
)2
+
(
shareprot,nati39 − shareprot,expi46
)2
+
(
shareother,nati39 − shareother,expi46
)2]0.5
. (9)
The ﬁrst stage regression for the predicted religious distance is:
ReligiousDistancei50 = δ + λ1ReligiousDistancei46 + λ2ExpelleeSharei50
+λ3Agriculturei39 +Xi39λ4 + ui50, (10)
The key identifying assumption of the IV regression is Cov(ReligiousDistancei46, ui50) = 0.
5 Empirical Evidence
The ﬁgures in Section 3 show substantial heterogeneity in integration outcomes across regions
and reveal clear regional clusters. The following section aims at explaining this heterogeneity
in order to understand what hampers and what promotes integration. In particular, we
explore how the population share of expellees, the rurality of the receiving region, and the
31
                            33 / 60
 religious distance between expellees and natives determine integration outcomes. We consider
three dimensions of integration: economic, political, and social integration. Causal evidence
for each of these three dimensions is presented in the following subsections.
5.1 Economic Integration
We start with the determinants of expellees’ economic integration, where economic integration
is measured by success on the labor market. In a ﬁrst set of regressions, we use the labor force
participation rate of expellees in 1950 as the dependent variable. For a start, we focus on the
size of regional expellee inﬂows. Column (1) of Table 3 presents estimates from an OLS model
that includes the population share of expellees in 1950 as the variable of interest as well as
our set of control variables (see Section 4.2). The correlation between the share of expellees
arriving and the share of expellees in the labor force is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
(column (1)). In other words, the more expellees settled in a county, the lower the share of
those who became economically integrated in the labor market. The estimated coeﬃcient of
-0.305 implies that a one standard deviation increase in the 1950 share of expellees (s.d. 0.089)
reduces labor force participation of expellees by 0.44 standard deviations, or 6.0% relative to
the mean labor force participation rate across all counties.
In Figure C, panel (a) in the Appendix we draw the (unconditional) linear regression
line on the scatter plot between the population share of expellees in 1950 and the labor
force participation rate. The ﬁgure illustrates that the relationship between the labor force
participation rate of expellees and their population share is approximately linear and not
driven by outliers. As this is true for all of our independent and dependent variables of
interest (panels (b) to (i)), we stick to linear speciﬁcations in all following regressions.
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 Next, we turn to our second variable of interest: the agricultural employment share in 1939.
The correlation between pre-war agricultural employment and the labor market integration
of expellees is negative and statistically signiﬁcant (point estimate: -0.230, column (2)). This
is consistent with the idea that agrarian regions had little capacity to absorb expellees, as
the amount of agricultural land was limited (Grosser 2006). In terms of magnitude, a one
standard deviation increase in the agricultural employment share in 1939 lowers expellees’
labor force participation rate by 0.86 standard deviations.
In column (3), we consider the correlation between the labor force participation rate in
1950 and the religious distance between expellees and natives in that year. The results show no
correlation between religious dissimilarity and economic integration (point estimate: -0.002).
As discussed earlier, expellees were primarily settled in rural regions where more intact
housing was available. In fact, expellee shares in 1950 and agricultural employment shares
in 1939 are positively correlated. In a next step, we therefore include all three variables of
interest in one regression model to separate the inﬂuence of expellee share and agricultural
employment. The results in column (4) show point estimates that are somewhat smaller in
absolute size. Still, we ﬁnd that expellee inﬂow and a county’s pre-war agricultural employ-
ment are economically and statistically signiﬁcant determinants of economic integration. The
coeﬃcients of our control variables remain insigniﬁcant: Neither did counties at the inner-
German border perform worse than other counties in terms of economic integration nor did
rubble per capita aﬀect expellees’ labor force participation.
In column (5), we probe the robustness of our results and add ﬁxed eﬀects for the nine
West German states to the set of control variables. These state dummies purge any unob-
served factors at the state level which might simultaneously aﬀect our explanatory variables
of interest and the integration of expellees into the labor force.7 That is, we exclusively
use the within-state variation to identify the eﬀect of the diﬀerent explanatory variables on
economic integration. The coeﬃcient of the expellee share is virtually unchanged at -0.155.
That is, a one standard deviation increase in the 1950 share of expellees reduces labor force
7Note that adding state dummies has the downside of removing a lot of variation from our data set:
regressing the 1950 share of expellees on state dummies gives an R2 of 0.67.
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 participation of expellees by 0.23 standard deviations (or 3% relative to the mean). The
coeﬃcient of the agricultural employment share is very similar to before and clearly reveals
worse economic integration prospects in more agrarian counties: A one-standard-deviation
increase in the agricultural employment share reduces labor force participation of expellees
by as much as -0.56 standard deviations. We still ﬁnd no eﬀect of religious distance on the
economic integration of expellees in Germany.
As discussed in Section 2, expellees did not sort with a view to economic integration
prospects and faced very tight moving restrictions. To alleviate concerns that some expellees
might nevertheless have endogenously moved by 1950, we estimate IV regressions. There
are two instruments that we use. First, we use the expellee share in 1946 as an instrument
for the 1950 expellee share. Second, we use the predicted religious distance calculated with
1939 and 1946 values as instrument for the religious distance observed in 1950. Our IV
strategy thus isolates the variation in expellee shares and religious distance that is due to the
initial placement of expellees only (see Section 4 for a discussion of the instruments and the
identifying assumptions).
Columns (6) and (7) in Table 3 contain the IV regression results for the labor force
participation rate as dependent variable (without and with state-ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively).
These are our preferred speciﬁcations. The lower part of the table presents summary results
for the ﬁrst-stage regressions. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic varies between 759 and
1028, suggesting that we do not have a weak instrument problem (for critical values see Stock
and Yogo (2005)). Both of our instruments are relevant as shown by Shea’s partial R2 above
0.7. The detailed ﬁrst stage regression results in the appendix reveal a strong economical and
statistical relationship between the expellee share 1946 and the expellee share 1950 as well
as between the predicted religious distance and the actual religious distance 1950 (see Table
D1).
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 The second stage results in columns (6) and (7) of Table 3 conﬁrm that expellee inﬂows
and the 1939 agricultural employment share had a highly signiﬁcant negative impact on
expellees’ labor force participation rates–irrespective of whether we include state ﬁxed eﬀects
or not. The coeﬃcient estimates on the share of expellees are -0.186 (s.e. 0.037) and -0.257
(s.e. 0.059) without and with state ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively. The point estimate of -0.257 in
the fully-ﬂedged speciﬁcation with state ﬁxed eﬀects suggests that an increase in the share of
expellees settling in a county by one standard deviation reduces their labor force participation
rate by 0.37 standard deviations or 5%. An increase in the agricultural employment share
by one standard deviation worsens expellees’ labor force participation rate by 0.53 standard
deviations or 7.7% (point estimate with state ﬁxed eﬀects, column (7)).
To further probe the robustness of our results we use the employment rate as an alternative
dependent variable (columns (8) and (9)). To wit, we focus on active persons with employ-
ment only (and disregard active persons without employment). Note that this information is
available for a subset of 487 counties only so that we have to run the following regressions on
a smaller subsample. Based on the regression without (with) state ﬁxed eﬀects we see a one
standard deviation increase in expellee inﬂow to reduce employment by 0.30 (0.35) standard
deviations, respectively. The corresponding results for the agricultural employment share are
a reduction in employment by 0.71 (without state ﬁxed eﬀects) and 0.59 (with state ﬁxed
eﬀects) standard deviations, respectively.
Table 4 present additional robustness checks to our preferred speciﬁcations (from Table
3, columns (6) and (7)). First, we run unweighted regressions in columns (1) and (2). And
second, we use the loss in housing space in three categories (columns (3) and (4)) as well as the
share of damaged dwellings (columns (5) and (6)) as alternative measures of war destruction.
Reassuringly, in all of these robustness checks our point estimates hardly change. Finally,
in columns (7) and (8), we use the labor force participation rate of expellees calculated over
the population of working age, instead of over the population as a whole, as an alternative
dependent variable. Since data on the expellee population by age is not available at the county
level, we rely on data at the more aggregated district level (see Footnote 3 for details). We
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 again ﬁnd that the expellee share and agricultural employment have a strong negative eﬀect
on labor force participation.
5.2 Social Integration
Next, we investigate the determinants of social integration. We measure social integration by
the intermarriage rate between expellees and natives. Table 5 presents our core results on
how expellee shares, pre-war agricultural employment of the receiving county, and religious
distance aﬀect intermarriage behavior. We begin by regressing the intermarriage rate sep-
arately on each of our variables of interest (conditional on our standard set of covariates).
Column (1) shows an economically and statistically signiﬁcant negative correlation between
the expellee share in 1950 and the intermarriage rate. This is consistent with the view that
higher expellee shares made it easier for expellees to keep to themselves and intensiﬁed animos-
ity between natives and expellees (Connor 2007), both leading to lower intermarriage rates.
Column (2) displays a signiﬁcant negative correlation between the agricultural employment
share in 1939 and intermarriage behavior, conditional on covariates. As hypothesised, more
agrarian communities were thus less inclined to socially intermix (Bayerisches Statistisches
Landesamt 1950, Connor 2007, Schulze 2002). We again do not ﬁnd any relationship between
religious distance and integration (column (3)).
In columns (4) and (5), we combine all explanatory variables in one OLS regression. The
speciﬁcations in columns (4) and (5) diﬀer in that state ﬁxed eﬀects are added in column (5),
which thus only exploits within-state variation. Compared to the simple regressions in the ﬁrst
columns, the coeﬃcients for both expellee and agricultural employment shares decrease some-
what but remain economically and statistically signiﬁcant. An increase in the 1950 expellee
share by one standard deviation lowers the intermarriage rate by 0.30 standard deviations
or 6.9% (estimate of -0.366, column (5)). A one-standard-deviation increase in the agricul-
tural employment share has about two thirds of this eﬀect and decreases the intermarriage
rate by 0.18 standard deviations (estimate of -0.079, column (5)). Note that the coeﬃcient
on the religious distance turns signiﬁcant at the 5%-level once we only exploit within-state
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 variation by including state-ﬁxed eﬀects. The eﬀect of religious distance is moderate: The
point estimate suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in religious distance reduces
intermarriage rates by 0.11 standard deviations.
To deal with expellees who potentially moved endogenously based on unobserved factors,
we again estimate IV regressions without and with state-ﬁxed eﬀects. Results are presented
in columns (6) and (7), respectively. Diﬀerences between the OLS and IV estimation results
are small and conﬁdence intervals overlap. This suggests that endogenous self-selection of
expellees into regions between 1946 and 1950 is a minor issue (in line with historical writings
on this issue by, e.g., Mu¨ller and Simon (1959) and Ziemer (1973)).
So far, we have studied overall intermarriage rates. These overall rates, however, poten-
tially mask important diﬀerences in social integration between male and female expellees. In
columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, we therefore provide OLS and IV estimation results for the
intermarriage rate between male expellees and female natives only. As we can see from the
table, the social integration of male expellees is much more susceptible to the environment.
In particular, an increase in the share of expellees arriving in a county markedly reduces the
probability of male expellees to marry a female native: we ﬁnd that an increase in the 1950
expellee share by one standard deviation lowers the intermarriage rate of male expellees by
0.46 standard deviations or 10.4% (OLS estimate of -0.553, column (1) of Table 6) compared
to 0.30 standard deviations or 6.9% for all expellees (OLS estimate of -0.366, column (5) of
Table 5). Also, religious dissimilarity appears to have been particularly detrimental for the
social integration of male expellees.
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 As a robustness check, we additionally estimate unweighted regressions, taking the OLS
and IV regression with covariates and state ﬁxed eﬀects on all expellees as our benchmark
(columns (5) and (7) of Table 5). Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 show the results. Point
estimates are larger but statistically indistinguishable from the benchmark. This also holds
true if we take the loss in housing space in three categories (columns (5) and (6)) or the
share of damaged dwellings (columns (7) and (8)) as alternative measures of war destruction.
Taken together, the results on intermarriage rates show that a stronger inﬂow of expellees, a
more rural society and a larger religious distance hampered expellees and natives to socially
intermix.
5.3 Political Integration
In a third set of results, we consider expellees’ political integration. Our main indicator for
(slow) political integration is the vote share of the anti-expellee party Bayernpartei (BP) in
the Bavarian federal state election in 1950.8 We again start by regressing the vote share for
BP separately on each of our three main variables (conditional on our standard covariates)
and subsequently combine all variables into one OLS and IV regression, respectively. Results
are reported in Table 7, columns (1) to (5). The vote share for the anti-expellee party
increases with the population share of expellees, with pre-war agricultural employment of
the county and with the religious distance between expellees and natives. The combined
OLS (IV) regression suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the share of expellees
adds as much as 2 percentage points (2.8 percentage points) to the vote share of the anti-
expellee party BP. Given that the average vote share of BP was 18.6% at that time, this
corresponds to an increase of 10.8% (15.0%). Correspondingly, a one standard deviation
increase in the agricultural employment share (in religious distance) raises the vote share by
about 4 percentage points (2 percentage points).
As an alternative dependent variable we consider the vote share for special interest parties,
namely the sum of the vote share of the BP and of the expellee party Block der Heimatver-
8Note that the fact that we are exploiting a federal state election renders state ﬁxed eﬀects superﬂuous.
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 triebenen und Entrechteten (BHE). Columns (6) and (7) of the table show in an OLS and IV
regression that the larger the share of expellees, the larger the agricultural employment share
and the larger the religious distance between expellees and natives, the more are election
outcomes driven by vested interests. In terms of magnitude, we ﬁnd that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the share of expellees leads to a 6.4 percentage points higher vote share
for special interest parties and a one-standard-deviation increase in the agricultural employ-
ment share to an increase by 4.1 percentage points (calculations based on estimates from
column (7)). A one-standard-deviation larger religious distance increases the vote share by
2.4 percentage points.
Our regressions on the vote share of BP are based on the vote share in the overall popu-
lation, vpopi , that is, the number of votes for BP divided by the total number of votes. What
we are eventually interested in, however, is the propensity of natives in a county i to vote
for BP, vnati , and how this share relates to the population share of expellees in that county,
ExpelleeSharei50. If we are ready to assume that expellees do not vote for BP and its anti-
expellee election program, we can derive the share of natives who vote for BP by rewriting
the population vote share for BP
vpopi = (1− ExpelleeSharei50)vnati (11)
as
vnati =
vpopi
(1− ExpelleeSharei50) . (12)
This implies that the relationship between share of expellees and native votes for the anti-
expellee party is even stronger than displayed in Table 7.9
9To see this consider the derivative of vnati , v
nat′
i =
v
pop′
i
(1−ExpelleeSharei50) +
v
pop
i
(1−ExpelleeSharei50)2 and compare
it to the derivative of vpopi . As v
nat′
i > v
pop′
i ∀ExpelleeSharei50 > 0, we underestimate the eﬀect by looking at
the vote share in the overall population.
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 Given this insight, we use the approximated vote share of BP among natives, vnati , as
an alternative dependent variable. Results are shown in Table 8. Columns (1) to (3) again
present the correlations with each of our main variables of interest (conditional on our standard
covariates). Columns (4) and (5) display the results of OLS and IV regressions, respectively,
that combine all of these variables. The estimated eﬀect of the expellee share on the propensity
to vote for BP for natives is about twice as large as is the propensity to vote for BP in the
overall population which we estimated above. In the combined OLS (IV) regressions, we ﬁnd
that a one standard deviation increase in the share of expellees adds 4 percentage points (5
percentage points) to the vote share of the anti-immigrant party BP in the native population.
We complete our analysis on the political integration of expellees by studying the medium
run vote shares for BP and for special interest parties. More precisely, we look at state election
outcomes in 1954 and in 1958. That is, we analyze voting behavior more than ten years after
the arrival of expellees. For each of the elections, we again consider the vote share for BP
(the national party) and the vote share for special interest parties. OLS and IV results are
reported in Table 9. We expect our variables of interest to lose explanatory power with time
as expellees become more politically integrated. That is what we ﬁnd for the expellee share
and agricultural employment. While the coeﬃcient on the expellee share in the BP regression
is 0.509 in 1950 (Table 7, column (5)) it recedes to 0.365 in 1958 (Table 9, column (4)).
Similarly, the coeﬃcient on the agricultural employment share in 1958 shrinks to one third
of its 1950 value and turns statistically insigniﬁcant. These ﬁndings reﬂect the advancing
integration of expellees into West German society.
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 Two points are remarkable though. First, comparing the 1954 to the 1950 regression
results reveals that political integration takes a considerable amount of time: The coeﬃcients
on the expellee share and on religious distance in the 1954 regressions are very similar to
the corresponding ones in the 1950 regressions (both OLS and IV). And second, the 1958
regressions show that even ten years after the arrival of expellees their political integration
is far from being completed: the statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the share of expellees
in column (4) suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in the share of expellees still
increases the vote share of the national party BP by 2.0 percentage points in 1958.
These patterns also become visible when we turn to the vote share for special interest
parties as dependent variable (results reported in columns (5) to (8)). Our OLS and IV
regressions provide evidence for deepening but sluggish political integration. In 1958 a one-
standard-deviation increase in the share of expellees leads to 4.5 percentage points more votes
for special interest parties (column (8)), compared to 6.4 percentage points eight years earlier.
While the agricultural employment share is no longer a statistically signiﬁcant determinant
of the electoral support for BP and BHE, religious distance between expellees and natives
remains a strong predictor for the success of these parties in 1958.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the integration of forced migrants. In
particular, we provide novel insights on the local factors that impede or facilitate the in-
tegration of forced migrants. Such insights are crucial for designing resettlement programs
that account for the eﬀect of resettlement locations on integration outcomes. We consider
three much debated potential determinants of economic, social, and political integration: the
population share of migrants, the rurality of the receiving region, and religious diﬀerences
between migrants and natives.
To shed light on each of these factors, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the
spatial distribution of refugees, arising from the ﬂight and expulsion of ethnic Germans from
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 Eastern Europe after World War II. About 8 million displaced Germans were resettled in
West Germany, where they accounted for 16.5% of the population in 1950. Most importantly
for our identiﬁcation strategy, expellees were distributed very unevenly across West Germany
and regardless of their integration prospects.
Using newly digitalized high-quality data at the county level, we embrace a broad concept
of integration and investigate local labor market outcomes, marriage market behavior, and
voting pattern. Our results show that local conditions play an important role in shaping
integration outcomes, and bring a trade-oﬀ to light which policymakers in the current“refugee
crisis” also face today: On the one hand, refugees should be evenly dispersed across regions
as higher population shares of refugees deteriorate economic, social and political integration
outcomes. On the other hand, refugees should be sent to more urban areas as these provide
signiﬁcantly better integration prospects. This result cautions against the widely held belief
that today’s refugees should be mainly sent to rural areas to avoid the formation of ghettos
in the cities and to foster rural revival (Bloem 2014, Mart´ınez Juan 2017).
While the literature has so far mainly focused on how the innate characteristics of refugees
aﬀect their integration outcomes, this is only part of the story. The decision of policymak-
ers where to re-settle immigrants proves an important driver of integration. Since the re-
settlement location is a policy variable, while the innate characteristics of refugees are not,
the former warrants further analysis. We thus conclude by highlighting the need for future
work in the area. In particular, our results are speciﬁc to an episode of mass immigration, in
which natives and refugees were very similar in many respects, including their mother tongue
and cultural background. An important tasks for future work is to assess whether simi-
lar ﬁndings hold for the resettlement of refugees into religiously and culturally more distant
locations.
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 A Merging of counties
The administrative borders of some West German counties changed between 1939 and 1950.
In order to make county borders comparable over time, we ﬁrst merge counties which, at any
time between 1939 and 1950 formed one county. The counties of Hildesheim and Marienburg,
for instance, were separate entities in 1939, but were merged to join the new county of
Hildesheim-Marienburg in 1946. Consequently, the 1946 and 1950 censuses only contain data
on Hildesheim-Marienburg. We thus merge Hildesheim and Marienburg already in the 1939
census. We proceed analogously for the counties of Bremerhaven and Wesermu¨nde; city and
rural districts of Bremen; Rhein-Wupper Kreis and Leverkusen; Kreis der Eder, Kreis des
Eisenberges and Kreis der Twiste; city and rural districts of Konstanz; Coburg and Rodach
bei Coburg; city and rural districts of Dinkelsbu¨hl; city and rural districts of Donauwo¨rth,
city and rural districts of Lu¨neburg.
In addition, there were some smaller border changes, in which municipalities were moved
from one county to another. To deal with these border changes, we ﬁrst compare the 1939
population of each county in its 1950 borders to the 1939 population of the same county in
its 1939 borders. Since the majority of administrative borders remained unchanged between
1939 and 1950, the 1939 population ﬁgure is usually the same regardless of whether we use
1939 or 1950 borders. Moreover, we do not take any action if the diﬀerence between the two
population ﬁgures is less than 5%. If the diﬀerence is larger than 5%, we merge the counties
that exchanged municipalities. This applies to the counties of Osterholz, Verden and Bremen;
Bergstraße, city and rural districts of Worms; Goslar, Wolfenbu¨ttel and Salzgitter; Mainz,
Groß-Gerau and Wiesbaden; Bo¨blingen, Eßlingen and Stuttgart; city and rural districts of
Osnabru¨ck; city and rural districts of Mu¨nchen; city and rural districts of Kulmbach; Lo¨rrach
and Neustadt; Norden and Emden; Braunschweig and Peine.
Finally, we drop counties that have lost or gained more than 5% of its 1939 population
to regions outside West Germany, in particular to counties in the Soviet Occupation Zone.
These counties include Blankenburg (Rest); Helmstedt; Birkenfeld; Zweibru¨cken; Saarburg;
Trier; Mellrichstadt; Osterode; Lu¨neburg.
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 B Data sources
Table B1: Data sources
Variable Description and data source
Dependent variables
Expellee labor force participa-
tion rate 1950
The share of economically active persons in the total ex-
pellee population in 1950, based on data from Statistisches
Bundesamt (1955).
Expellee employment rate
1950
Calculated as (100 − Expellee unemployment rate) ×
Expellee labor force participation rate. Data on expellee
unemployment rate comes from Pfeil (1958).
Intermarriage rates 1950 Index for intermarriage rates between expellees and non-
expellees in 1950, taken from Poepelt (1959).
Vote shares of Bayernpartei
(and BHE) 1950/54/58
Vote share of Bayernpartei (and BHE) in the Bavarian state
elections of 1950, 1954, and 1958, as published in Bayerisches
Statistisches Landesamt (1951), Bayerisches Statistisches
Landesamt (1955), and Bayerisches Statistisches Landesamt
(1959).
Main explanatory variables
Expellee share in 1950 The share of expellees in the 1950 population, based on data
from Statistisches Bundesamt (1952) and Statistisches Bun-
desamt (1955).
Expellee share in 1946 The share of expellees in the 1946 population, based on
Statistisches Bundesamt (1950).
Agricultural employment
share in 1939
The share of the workforce in agriculture in 1939, as pub-
lished in Statistisches Reichsamt (1939)
Religious distance 1950 The Euclidean distance between the religious aﬃliations of
expellees and non-expellees in 1950, based on data from
Statistisches Bundesamt (1952). Data on religious aﬃli-
ations in 1939, required for calculating the instrument in
equation (9), comes from Statistisches Reichsamt (1941).
Control variables
Population share living in
cities with at least 10,000 in-
habitants 1939
The 1939 share of population living in cities with at least
10,000 inhabitants, based on data from Statistisches Reich-
samt (1940).
Rubble per capita 1939 Untreated rubble at the end of the war over the population
in 1939, as taken from Deutscher Sta¨dtetag (1949).
Damaged dwellings 1945 Share of dwellings built before 1945 damaged in the war,
based on data from Statistisches Bundesamt (1956).
Distance to inner German
border < 75 km (0/1)
Dummy for whether a county is located within 75 kilometers
from the inner-German border.
Majority is Catholic in 1939
(0/1)
Dummy for whether the majority of a county was Catholic
in 1939, based on data from Statistisches Reichsamt (1941).
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 C Additional descriptives
Figure C: Scatter plots for dependent and main independent variables
.3
.4
.5
.6
La
bo
r f
or
ce
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
ra
te
 o
f e
xp
el
le
es
 in
 1
95
0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Expellee share in 1950
(a)
.3
.4
.5
.6
La
bo
r f
or
ce
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
ra
te
 o
f e
xp
el
le
es
 in
 1
95
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Share of workforce in agriculture in 1939
(b)
.3
.4
.5
.6
La
bo
r f
or
ce
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
ra
te
 o
f e
xp
el
le
es
 in
 1
95
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Religious distance in religion between expellees and natives in 1950
(c)
.4
.6
.8
1
M
ar
ria
ge
 in
de
x 
in
 1
95
0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Expellee share in 1950
(d)
.4
.6
.8
1
M
ar
ria
ge
 in
de
x 
in
 1
95
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Share of workforce in agriculture in 1939
(e)
.4
.6
.8
1
M
ar
ria
ge
 in
de
x 
in
 1
95
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Religious distance in religion between expellees and natives in 1950
(f)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
V
ot
e 
sh
ar
e 
fo
r B
ay
er
np
ar
te
i (
na
tio
na
l p
ar
ty
) i
n 
19
50
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Expellee share in 1950
(g)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
V
ot
e 
sh
ar
e 
fo
r B
ay
er
np
ar
te
i (
na
tio
na
l p
ar
ty
) i
n 
19
50
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Share of workforce in agriculture in 1939
(h)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
V
ot
e 
sh
ar
e 
fo
r B
ay
er
np
ar
te
i (
na
tio
na
l p
ar
ty
) i
n 
19
50
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Religious distance in religion between expellees and natives in 1950
(i)
Notes: Scatter plots (a)-(c) show the correlations between our main variables of interest and the labor
force participation rate of expellees in 1950. Scatter plots (d)-(f) show the correlations for the marriage
index, and scatter plots (g)-(i) show the correlations for the vote share for the Bayernpartei as anti-expellee
party.
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 D First stage results
Table D1: First stage results - forced immigration and labor force participation
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Expellee share 1950
Expellee share 1946 0.879*** 0.895***
(0.017) (0.027)
Agricultural employment share 1939 -0.001 -0.025***
(0.008) (0.009)
Predicted religious distance 1939/1946 -0.002 -0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
0.006 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Rubble per capita 1939 -0.570*** -0.362**
(0.165) (0.150)
0.007** 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003)
Majority is Catholic in 1939 (0/1) -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Dependent variable: Religious distance 1950
Expellee share 1946 0.044 0.104
(0.076) (0.157)
Agricultural employment share 1939 -0.111** -0.082*
(0.044) (0.043)
Predicted religious distance 1939/1946 0.776*** 0.767***
(0.030) (0.032)
-0.022 -0.005
(0.015) (0.022)
Rubble per capita 1939 -1.354* -1.237*
(0.694) (0.729)
-0.027* -0.021
(0.014) (0.014)
Majority is Catholic in 1939 (0/1) 0.062*** 0.053***
(0.013) (0.015)
State dummies no yes
Number of observations 526 526
Population share living in cities with at least 10,000 
inhabitants 1939
Distance to inner German border is smaller than 75 km (0/1)
Population share living in cities with at least 10,000 
inhabitants 1939
Distance to inner German border is smaller than 75 km (0/1)
Notes: The table presents the ﬁrst stage regression results pertaining to columns (6) to (9) of Table 2,
columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, columns (5) and (6) of Table 4, columns (6) and (7) of Table 5, and
column (2) of Table 6 . The ﬁrst stage regressions use the expellee share in 1946 and the predicted
population-weighted religious distance as instrument for the expellee share 1950 and the religious distance
1950, respectively. Column (2) includes dummies for each of the nine West German states. Regressions
are weighted with population in 1939. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%-, 5%- and
10%-level, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the labor market region level are in parentheses.
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